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CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION*
Honorable William J. Brennan, Jr.**
My subject is "Constitutional Adjudication." That of course is a title
which states the ultimate responsibility of the Supreme Court. But a discussion
of that responsibility cannot be enlightening without a reminder of two fundamentals that mark our unique structure of government in these, United States.
First. The Framers of the Constitution consciously erected a governmental
structure which diffuses governmental power. Their concept was that the largest
threat to the maintenance of a democratic society lies in undue centralization
of governmental power. Their hope was that control by the governed of their
society would be assured if they prevented undue concentration of power in
any particular governors. To secure this they created a national government
of specifically delegated and limited powers and state governments of reserved
and independent powers. And in constructing the national government they
further diffused power among the three branches - legislative, executive and
judicial. But they also engrafted limitations upon all the repositories of governmental power, national and state. Some of these limitations were written into
the body of the Constitution itself. The prohibitions in article I, sections 9 and 10,
are illustrative. They include, for example, the limitations - applicable both
to federal and state governments - against the passage of any bill of attainder
or ex post facto law. But most of the restraints are found in the Bill of Rights,
initially applied to the federal government by, the first ten amendments and
extended in large part against the States by the fourteenth amendment.
Second. The special role assigned to the Supreme Court. is the interpretation of the Constitution in such way as to carry out this scheme of the Framers.
The Supreme Court is a court with all that the word implies to the AngloAmerican tradition. But one-half of every term's docket - and much the more
important half -is quite different from normal judicial business and quite
unlike the usual flow of litigation through state and inferior federal courtsindeed, probably quite unlike the judicial business of any other court in the
*
**
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world. The central quality of this half of the docket is that the real contest
in any case is not so much between the actual parties to it. For, from our
beginnings, a most important consequence of the constitutionally created separations of powers has been the American habit, extraordinary to other democracies, of casting social, economic, philosophical and political questions in the
form of actions at law and suits in equity. In this way, important aspects of
the most fundamental issues confronting our democracy end up ultimately in
the Supreme Court for judicial determination. The Solicitor General of the
United States has observed that "they are the issues upon which our society,
consciously or unconsciously, is most deeply divided. They arouse the deepest
emotions. Their resolution - one way or the other - often rewrites our future
history." Until perhaps thirty years ago, the prime examples were contests between
state and federal authority and the definitions of the powers of the federal
executive and legislative branches. Over the past thirty years, and only over
that relatively split second of time, the chief subject of the cases coming to the
Court has concerned the relationship of the individual with governmentstate and federal- that is, with the interpretation and application of the
limitations upon governmental power embodied primarily in the Bill of Rights.
A distinguished scholar of the work of the Court, Professor Paul A. Freund
of Harvard, has said that:
The current development in constitutional law is to be viewed
in the light of the basic functions of the Court in the decision of
cases. Three of these functions will help to explain many of the
recent controversial trends. [And I interpolate that the basic functions of future Justices won't differ.]
First of all, [because of the way the Framers separated or
divided national governmental power] the Court has a responsibility to maintain the constitutional order, the distribution of public
power and the limitations on that power. The essential powers of
government have been recognized and validated by the Court as
never before in our history. [In cases decided over the past 30 years.]
Congress enjoys constitutional authority over commerce, defense,
and the revenues at least as broad as it is likely to wish to exercise.
The States are permitted to tax and regulate in ways that were
foreclosed or dubious a generation or two ago. Taxation of interstate enterprise, of federal salaries, regulation not only for health,
safety and morals but for aesthetic purposes as well, jurisdiction
over out-of-state business, are extensions of public power that liberate the law-making process in the States as well as in the Nation.
It is in the realm of procedure that the Court has now been
more insistent. And it is appropriate that this should be so. The
judges are not experts by virtue of their training or their commissions in the field of economics or public policy. They are, however,
the special guardians of legal procedures, of the standards of decency
and fair play that should be the counterpoise to the extensive affirmative powers of government. In criminal prosecutions juries are
to be fairly selected, evidence is to be legally obtained, and defendants charged with serious offenses are to have the benefit of counsel. Legislative investigations, more frequent and wide-ranging
than ever before, are to be conducted with due regard for the right
of the witness to know the pertinency of the questions and to be
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free of public inquisition that is not related to a legislative purpose.
We do well to remember the admiration with which the AngloAmerican system of procedure is regarded throughout the world.
Peoples that have thrown off the colonial political yoke, whether
in India or Israel or Nigeria, have been zealous to retain the procedural guarantees which they learned to prize before their independence.
A second great mission of the Court is to maintain a common
market of continental extent against state barriers or state, trade
preferences. To balance the need for local revenue against the claims
of freedom of trade has been another of the tasks and achievements
of the Court that now serves as a model for emerging federations
on other continents. Western European lawyers are astonished at
the wealth of experience and analysis to be found in the U.S.
Reports on the problems of a working federation.
In the third place, there falls to the Court a vital role in the
preservation of an open society, whose government is to remain
both responsive and responsible. This too is a corollary of expanding public power. Responsive government requires freedom of expression; responsible government demands fairness of representation. In this context it is not hard to appreciate the central importance of decisions on freedom of press and assembly, on voting
rights, and on reapportionment.
• . . But it is well to cultivate perspective, to recognize that
although there has been highly significant movement in constitutional doctrine that has to be assimilated rapidly, it has not come
as suddenly or as drastically as the more vehement critics assert.
The right to counsel for indigent defendants has now been
established after twenty years of experience with a rule that
made the requirement turn on the facts of each case and thus converted any trial without counsel into the uncertainties of a potential Supreme Court controversy. In those twenty years the States
were afforded time in which to bring their procedures into conformity with the best practice. The same is true of the rule that
now excludes illegally obtained evidence from criminal trials in the
States, after experimenting with a rule that made admissibility turn
on the degree of outrageousness of the illegal search and seizure.
Legislative investigating committees have not been denied the
authority to inquire into the associations of a witness; they must,
however, first establish the pertinence of those associations and show
probable cause that they have involved illegal or subversive activities..

. . The public schools have, to be sure, been forbidden to

install prayers even of a diluted sort; but [given the constitutional
injunction of neutrality of government in matters of religion] the
alternative would have been to put the Court in the business of
picking and choosing among prayers and thus compounding the
intrusion of the secular into the religious sphere. Moreover, the
[prayer decisions do] not prevent the public schools from engaging
in moral education. They are prevented only from doing it in a
way that puts psychological constraints on religious minorities in
the coercive atmosphere of the school room.'
This evolution of constitutional doctrine in our lifetimes only reflects the
momentous changes we have witnessed in our society. It is a truism that the
1 Address by Paul A. Freund, May, 1963.
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change that has swept the world in our century has altered the lives of nearly
every person in it. Has this time of change run its course? I don't think so.
The chances are better that for a world on the threshold of the space age,
even more momentous changes lie ahead. The signs are already about us. The
mists which have obscured the light of freedom and equality for countless tens
of millions are dissipating. For the unity of the human family is becoming
more and more distinct on the horizon of human events. The gradual civilization of all people replacing the civilization of only the elite, the rise of mass
education and mass media of communication, the formation of new thought
structures due to scientific advances and social evolution - all these phenomena
hasten that day. Our own nation has shrunk its distances to hours, its population is becoming primarily urban and suburban, its technology has spurred
an economy capable of fantastic production, and we have become leader of
a world composed of a host of new countries which are ready to follow but
also quick to reject the path that we take. Our political and cultural differences
cannot stop the progress which is making us a more united nation. The
maturing tolerance of our religious differences is both symptomatic and significant. As I read in a recent Jewish periodical:
Catholics are talking about their Jewish heritage; church leaders
are damning anti-Semitism as sin. Christian clergymen, educators and laymen are re-examining the face of Judaism and are finding a family resemblance in the features-marks of common
roots, common aspirations. And Jews are taking a closer look at
Christianity, are clarifying their own position, are publicly discussing
issues without embarrassment, apology, or compromise ....
There
is a movement toward unity-not theological unity, but unity as
people, as members of one American society working together
to
2
find solutions to mutual problems and mutual concerns.
These are facts that have compelled Law itself to rethink its role. None
of us in the ministry of the law, whether teacher, practitioner or judge, can
deny that Law has sometimes given cause for complaint, that Law has isolated
itself from the boiling and difficult currents of life as life is lived. This was not
so before the nineteenth century. When the common law flourished greatly,
Law was merged, perhaps too thoroughly, with the other disciplines and sources
of human value. Custom, for example, was the cherished source of the common law of that time. And what was declared custom but the accumulated
wisdom of social problems of society itself? The function of law was to formalize and preserve this wisdom, but it certainly did not purport to originate it.
However, under the influence of Austin and other legal thinkers who dominated legal thought in the nineteenth century, the vogue of isolating law from
the other disciplines, particularly from theology and from philosophy that was
not expressly legal philosophy, had its day. This was admittedly a notion of
law wholly unconcerned with the broader extralegal values pursued by society
at large or by the individual. It lived in a heaven of abstract technicalities
and legal forms, and found its answers to human problems in an aggregation
of already existing rules, or found no answers at all. The substantive problems
2

lanniello, Perspectives on a New Society, 17 AD. L. BULL. 1 (1964).
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of human living were left for adjustment to the psychologists, sociologists, educators, economists, bankers and other specialists.
But Law is again c9ming alive as a living process responsive to changing
human needs. The shift is to justice and away from fine-spun technicalities
and abstract rules. A report of the 1964 meeting of the American Bar Association in New York City has traced the evolution.3 The vogue for positivism
in jurisprudence-the obsession with what the law is, which leaves no room
for choice between equally acceptable alternatives -gave
way first to the
concept of sociological jurisprudence, primarily under Roscoe Pound's onslaughts begun over half a century ago. But sociological jurisprudence too had
a defect: While it "shifted the emphasis away from positivism ... it did so at
the expense of reality by substituting the abstract idea of society for the actuality
of the individual human beings who constitute society in fact."4 The new
jurisprudence constitutes, rather:
a recognition of human beings, as the most distinctive and important feature of the universe which confronts our senses, and of the
function of law as the historic means of guaranteeing that preeminence ..
. The new jurisprudence, as a whole, may be summarized as tending to explore specific, and familiar, situations from
a new viewpoint. In a scientific age it asks, in effect, what is the
nature of man, and what is the nature of the universe with which.
he is confronted.... Why is a human being important; what gives
him dignity; what limits his freedom to do whatever he likes; what
are his essential needs; whence comes his sense of injustice?5
Perhaps some of you may detect, as I think I do, a return to the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas in the new jurisprudence. Call it a resurgence
if you will of concepts of natural law- but no matter. St. Thomas, as you
will remember, was in complete agreement with the Greek tradition, both in
its Aristotelian and Platonic modes, that law must be concerned with seeing
things whole, that it is but part of the whole human situation and draws its
validity from its position in the entire scheme of things. It is folly to think
that law, any more than religion and education, should serve only its own
symmetry rather than ends defined by other disciplines.
While not yet dead, the Austinian concept of law is nonetheless dying.6
Law teaching is coming to emphasize the knowledge and experience of the
other disciplines, in particular those disciplines that examine or explain the functioning and nature of our society and the aspirations and needs of the individuals who compose that society; in line with this emphasis, the law schools
are beginning to insist on preparatory training in these related disciplines.
Huntington Cairns in his 1962 Cardozo Lecture emphasized the need for the
change when he said that "law to be effective, must conform to the world
'
in which it finds itself. That world is given; law does not make it."
3 ABA Section of International and Comparative Law. Report of Committee on New
Trends in Comparative Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy, 89 A.B.A. REP. 1 (1964).
4 Id. at 3.
5 Id. at 5-6.
6 See, e.g., Hart, Definition and Theory in jurisprudence, 70 Law Q. Rev. 37 (1954).

7 Cairns, Law and Its Premises, 24 As. L. Rv. 418 (1963).
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The shift from emphasis upon abstract rules to emphasis upon justice
has profound importance for judicial decision making.
[A] shift in the basic philosophy of law . . . results in an epochmaking difference in the way a concrete case is decided. Clearly,
cases alone, or even cases, the Bill of Rights, and the legislative
statutes together, are not enough; the philosophy of law which the
judge ...brings to the cases, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights,
and the legislative statutes is equally important. In fact, it is allimportant since it determines the interpretation that is put upon
the Bill of Rights, the legislative statute, and the case.8
Of course, the judge is not at large to decide according to his personal predilections. Cardozo spoke for all judges when he observed that:
... [T]he range of free activity is relatively small. We may easily
seem to exaggerate it through excess of emphasis. .

.

. Complete

freedom - unfettered and undirected - there never is. A thousand
limitations -the product some of statute, some of precedent, some
of vague tradition or of an immemorial technique - encompass and
edge us even when we think of ourselves as ranging freely and at
large. The inscrutable force of professional opinion presses upon
us like the atmosphere, though we are heedless of its weight. Narrow at best is any freedom that is allotted us. How shall we make
the most of it in service to mankind? 9
Ultimately in those cases where constitution or statute do not clearly decide
the case, the judge perforce makes, as Dean O'Meara of the Notre Dame Law
School has said, a value judgment, deciding according to his own intellect,
experience and conscience. For him, "The complex phenomenon which lawyers know as law is an always unfinished product. It may be compared to a
tapestry the weaving of which is never done, which repeats many of the patterns of the past but is constantly adding new patterns and variations on old
patterns."'"
Of course, the fact that Justices of the Court have always been called
upon to face and decide some of the dominant social, political, economic and
even philosophical issues thrown up by their times does not mean that the
Court is charged with making social, political, economic or philosophical decisions. Quite the contrary. The Court is not a council of Platonic guardians
given the function of deciding our most difficult and emotional questions according to the Justices' own notions of what is just or wise or politic. To the
extent that this function is a governmental function, it is the function of the people's elected representatives. The Justices are charged with deciding according to
law. Because the issues arise in the framework of concrete litigation, the issues
must be decided on facts embalmed in a record made by some lower court or
administrative agency. And while the Justices may and do consult history,
the text of the Constitution and relevant precedents dealing with that text are
their primary tools. It is indeed true, as Judge Learned Hand once said, that
8 Northrop, PhilosophicalIssues in Contemporary Law, 2 NATURAL L.F. 41, 48 (1957).
9 CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, 60-61 (1924).
10 O'Meara, The Notre Dame Program: Training Skilled Craftsmen and Leaders, 43
A.B.A.J. 614, 670 (1957).
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the judges authority depends upon the assumption that he speaks
with the mouth of others, that is to say, the momentum of his
utterances must be greater than any which his personal reputation
and character can command, if it is to do the work assigned to
it- if it is to stand against the passionate resentments arising out
of the interests he must frustrate- for while a judge must discover some composition with the dominant trends of his times, he
must preserve his authority by cloaking himself in the majesty of
an overshadowing past.
However, we must keep in mind that while the words of the Constitution are binding, their application to specific problems is not often easy. For
the Founding Fathers knew better than to pin down their descendants too
closely. Enduring principles rather than petty details were what they sought
to write down. Thus it is that the Constitution does not take the form of a
litany of specifics. There are therefore very few cases where the constitutional
answers are clear, all one way or all the other. Particularly difficult in this
regard are the cases raising conflicts between the individual and governmental
power-the area which in my time has primarily absorbed the Court's attention. Ultimately, of course, the Court must resolve the conflicts of competing
interests in these cases, but all Americans should keep in mind how intense
and troubling these conflicts can be. Where one man claims a right to speak
and the other man claims the right to be protected from abusive or dangerously
provocative remarks, the conflict is inescapable. Where the police have ample
external evidence of a man's guilt, but to be sure of their case put into evidence
a confession obtained through coercion, the conflict arises between his right
to a fair prosecution and society's right to protection against his depravity.
Where the Orthodox Jew wishes to open his shop and do business on the day
which non-Jews have chosen, and the legislature has sanctioned, as a day of
rest, the Court cannot escape a difficult problem of reconciling opposed interests. Finally, the coming of age of the Negro citizen, politically and economically, presents a conflict between the ideal of liberty and equality expressed in the Declaration of Independence, and, on the other hand, a way
of life rooted in the customs of many of our people. If all segments of our
society can be made to appreciate that there are such conflicts, and that they
require difficult choices, which in most cases involve constitutional rights- if
this alone is accomplished- we will have immeasurably enriched our common
understanding of the meaning and significance of our freedoms, as well as
have a better appreciation of the Court's function and its difficulties.
How conflicts such as these ought to be resolved is a question which constantly troubles our whole society. There should be no surprise, then, that
how properly to resolve them often produces sharp division within the Court
itself. When problems are so fundamental, the claims of the competing interests
are often nicely balanced, and close divisions are almost inevitable.
It should not be surprising then that Supreme Court decisions - and the
Justices themselves - will be caught up in public debate and not infrequently
be the subjects of bitter controversy. This has been'so throughout our history
as a nation. A Washington Post editorial not so long ago did not far miss
the mark by saying that this was so because:
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one of the primary functions of the Supreme Court is to keep
the people of the country from doing what they would like to do
-at times when what they would like to do runs counter to the
Constitution ....
The function of the Supreme Court is not to
count constituents; it is to interpret a fundamental charter which
imposes restraints on constituents. Independence and integrity, not
popularity, must be its standards.
Better public understanding of the Court's function and responsibility is an
urgent necessity of this day and perhaps will be an even greater necessity of
the future since, so to speak, what the Supreme Court does is no longer the
concern and interest simply of a political and intellectual elite-the cult of
"robe-ism" - but of every citizen. The cult of robe-ism is gone, and with it
much of the mystic of the judicial process. . . . The relationship between the
national government and the American people is different now even from
what it was just a few decades ago. One of the things that have changed in
America "is the concept of who matters among the governed, of who are the
people with whose opinion a government need be concerned." This echoed
Professor Freund's observation that "the most fundamental explanation of the
Court's survival and prestige must rest on public understanding of the role and
mission of the Court." I add for myself that it is obvious that this public understanding has not been lacking in the past. The question is how to secure that
understanding in the future, when decisions of the Court increasingly touch
the lives of every citizen. It is essential, just because the public questions which
the Court faces are pressing and divisive, that they be thoroughly canvassed in
public, each step of the time while the Court is evolving new principles -or
perhaps, more accurately, new applications of old principles to new problems
old principles only because they are embedded in our constitutional concept
of what constitutes a free and open society. The ultimate resolution of questions
fundamental to the whole community must be based on a common consensus
of understanding of the unique responsibility assigned to the Supreme Court.
It is not accurate to say that new adaptations of constitutional principles are
precipitately ordained by the Court.
Evolution of constitutional law has been, in fact, a moving consensus. New positions have been taken and then secured, with fresh
controversy revolving in turn about progression from the new consensus. Whether the Due Process Guarantee extended to matters
of substance as well as procedure, and whether the safeguards of
speech, press and assembly become applicable against the States
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, were in their day mooted
questions; nowadays these are seen as battles long ago, but the scope
of these guarantees is a lively issue that brings new disagreement
and uncertainty. 1
Controversies over constitutional limits upon governmental powers have
been with us from our national beginnings; we settle one only to have another
emerge of different mien. If the form of the challenges of the future cannot
be predicted with any assurance, we know it is inevitable that such challenges
will emerge, and that, as in the past, the issues they create will take the form
11

Freund, supra note 1.
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of cases and controversies. This will prove only over and over again that, in
a real sense, the calendar of the Supreme Court at any time will be a fairly
reliable mirror of the issues with which our society is struggling at that time.
Certainly we may expect not less but greater implication of the various constitutional guarantees designed to protect individual freedom from repressive
governmental action, federal and state. Of course, the federal system's diffusion of governmental power has the purpose of securing individual freedom.
But this is not all the Constitution provides to secure that end. There are also
explicit provisions to prevent government, state or federal,, from frustrating
the great design. I don't think there can be any challenge to the proposition
that the ultimate protection of individual freedom is found in court enforcement of these constitutional guarantees. This principle is perhaps most strikingly
illustrated by the reapportionment cases. Freedom of a state's citizens to experiment with their own economic and social programs is hardly meaningful if
the political processes by which such programs must be achieved are controlled
by only some of the people. The ideal is government of all the people, by all
the people, and for all the people. In the field of legislative apportionment, the
constitutional guarantee that each citizen will have an equal voice in his .govemnment is found in the equal protection clause. Our decisions in the reapportionment cases have enforced this guarantee, and the result should be
not the return of discredited judicial intrusion into the field of political judgment, but a more, effective operation of the processes by which political judgments are reached.
Similarly, our decisions in the racial discrimination cases have applied the
equal protection clause to prevent States from discriminating against citizens
because of the color of their skins. Equal protection of the laws means equal
protection today, whatever else the phrase may have meant in other times.
In the same area of responsibility falls, I think, the series of decisions extending
some of the guarantees of the first eight amendments to the States. The Bill
of Rights is the primary source of expressed information as to what is meant
by constitutional liberty. Its safeguards secure the climate which the law of
freedom needs in order to exist. It is true that they were added to the Constitution to operate solely against federal power.' But the fourteenth amendment was added in 1868 in response to a demand for national protection
against abuses of state power. Did that amendment extend the protection of
the first eight amendments against state power? At least ten Justices have believed so, including members of the present Court. But the view which has so
far prevailed stops short of that. This view is that "it is possible that some
of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial
of them would be a denial of due process of law."'" This is not a new view.
It dates at least from 1897,' and was given explicit expression by the Court in
1908.5 Before I came to the Court in 1956, application of this test had ex12
13

Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908).
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tended the guarantees of the first and fourth amendments and the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment; 6 during my tenure, the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination," the eighth amendment's prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishments,"8 and the sixth amendment's guarantee
of the assistance of counsel for an accused in a criminal prosecution 9 have
been extended. We have also held that the States may not use the fruits of an
illegal search and seizure to convict of crime.2"
At the same time the Court has debated whether a particular specific, as
applied to the federal government, has a different and more stringent meaning than it has when the fourteenth amendment applies the specific to the
States. The debate on this question still goes on but the prevailing view is that
a provision of the Bill of Rights which is enforced against the States under the
fourteenth amendment is enforced according to the same standards with which
it is enforced against federal encroachment.
It is true, as Justice Brandeis said, that "it is one of the happy incidents
of the Federal System that a State may serve as a laboratory, and try novel
social and economic experiments." But the Court has concluded that this does
not include the power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. Further, the Court has concluded that to
deny the States the power to impair a fundamental constitutional right is not
to increase federal power, but rather, to limit the power of both federal and
state governments in favor of safeguarding the fundamental rights and liberties of the individual. This, I think, promotes rather than undermines the basic
policy of avoiding excess concentration of power in government, federal or
state, which underlies our concepts of federalism.
The common thread of these holdings - none arrived at until after a
long series of decisions grappling with the pros and cons of the issues-has
been the conclusion that the guarantees in question are essential to the preservation and furtherance of the constitutional structure of government for a
free society. I am aware that some of these decisions have aroused the concern
of state judges, particularly insofar as they may affect the processes of state
criminal procedure. It cannot be denied that the decisions do restrict the
latitude of choice open to the States in this area. But that is a price which
must be paid for recognition and enforcement of guarantees deemed to have
a place among "those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions.' ' 2" But not all of the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights have yet been applied to the States, and future
Justices will have to decide which of the remaining ones should be extended.
The genius of the Constitution resides not in any static meaning that it had
in a world that is dead and gone, but in its adaptability to interpretations of
its great principles that cope with current problems and current needs.
16
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I would expect then that constitutional change will be a concomitant of
the changes in our society which the future will bring. Just as we have learned
that what our constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times
cannot be their measure to the vision of our time, similarly, what those fundamentals mean for us, our descendants will learn, cannot be the measure to the
vision of their time. The constant for Americans, for our ancestors, for ourselves, and we hope for future generations, is our commitment to the constitutional ideal of libertarian dignity protected through law. Crises in prospect are
creating, and will create, more and more threats to the achievement of that
ideal - more and more collisions of the individual with his government. The
need for judicial vigilance in the service of that ideal will not lessen. It will
remain the business of judges to protect fundamental constitutional rights which
will be threatened in ways not possibly envisaged by the Framers. Justices yet
to sit, like their predecessors, are destined to labor earnestly in that endeavor
- we hope with wisdomto reconcile the complex realities of their times
with the principles which mark a free people. For as the nation moves ever
forward towards its goals of liberty and freedom, and new and different constitutional stresses and strains emerge, the role of the Supreme Court will be
ever the same- to justify Madison's faith that "independent tribunals of
justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of [constitutional] rights."22
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